Over the past few decades, social enterprises have grown remarkably. This paper investigates how social enterprises a¤ect access to social services (e.g., education and health-care) and utilitarian welfare. To this end, two economic systems are compared: a market economy system, where all …rms are pro…t maximizers, and a mixed economy system, where both for-pro…t businesses and social enterprises are present. Findings show that individuals are more likely to have access to social services within mixed economy. Moreover, conditions are derived under which utilitarian welfare is larger within mixed economy. Public policies in support of social enterprises (e.g., subsidies) are shown to result in the following trade-o¤: access to social services is further enhanced but utilitarian welfare is more likely to be lower than that within market economy.
Introduction
In the aftermath of the economic crisis, Stiglitz (2009) remarked that productive organizations such as cooperative and socially oriented enterprises may play a key role in restoring people's con…dence. Indeed, these productive organizations "are less inclined to exploit those with whom they interact: their workers, their customers, and their suppliers" (p. 357). Accordingly, Stiglitz argued that an economy is more likely to be successful if it is able to "…nd a balance between markets, government, and other institutions, including not-for-pro…ts and cooperatives" (p. 348) and, as it can be inferred from his reasoning, that cooperative and socially oriented enterprises may help increase both the wellbeing of individuals and economic e¢ ciency. Put di¤erently, the welfare of citizens and producers may be positively a¤ected by the presence of di¤erent …rm types in the same sector of production.
Casual empirical observation of several services sectors across countries suggests that socially oriented enterprises play an increasingly important role. Some recent contributions have thus developed frameworks to explain the co-existence of mixed forms in the same market. For instance, Marwell and McInerney (2005) study the dynamic relationships that arise in a market where when for-pro…t, nonpro…t, and government providers coexist. Te'eni and Young (2003) focus on the resilience of nonpro…t …rms due to their relative advantages in the network economy.
To the best of our knowledge, however, no economics paper has relied on a formal theoretical analysis to investigate how the co-existence of diverse …rm types in the same sector a¤ects access to social services and economic e¢ ciency. The current work aims to …ll this gap by comparing two di¤erent economic systems. (i) An economy where all …rms are pro…t maximziers. This system is referred to as a market economy. (ii) An economy where both for-pro…t businesses and socially oriented enterprises are present.
This system is de…ned as a mixed economy. Throughout this paper, we refer to socially oriented organizations as social enterprises. According to the literature (e.g., Borzaga and Defourny, 2001 ) and recent instructions of the European Commission, as reported in the Social Europe Guide (European Commission, 2013a, 2013b), social enterprises are de…ned as hybrid organizations that balance their social mission with their entrepreneurial activity.
In addition, our study aims to contribute to the analysis of public policies supporting the presence of social enterprises.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, we describe how the meaning of "mixed economy" and the role of social enterprises have evolved over time; this will help contextualize the analysis. In Section 2, we describe the setup and main assumptions of the model. In Section 3, we study the equilibrium properties of the market economy and mixed economy. The two economies are compared in Section 4 to identify the conditions under which the presence of social enterprises in the production of social services enhances both the access of individuals to social service and utilitarian welfare. The social enterprises are supposed to be …nancially self-sustainable in that they are subject to a break-even constraint; public policies aimed at directly supporting social enterprises are disregarded. This part of the analysis could, therefore, provide normative insights into the access to the service and the e¢ ciency guaranteed by a mixed economy in countries where social enterprises are less likely to be directly supported by governments.
Sections 5 and 6 provide two extensions of the model. First, we introduce individuals who are in ‡uenced by ideological concerns when choosing which organization, either the for-pro…t or social enterprise, resort to. Second, we explicitly consider policies supporting the presence of social enterprises through, for example, subsidies. Section 7 concludes with policy recommendations. Computations and proofs of our results are in the online Appendix (attached to this submission).
Mixed Economy and Role of Social Enterprises
The term mixed economy can be used to de…ne the presence of di¤erent economic actors (e.g., private and public …rms), that produce a good or service. This de…nition has evolved over time, following the evolution of welfare systems and the role of a welfare state. 1 Focusing on social services sectors, we can remark that in most European economies, social services were supplied directly by public bodies until the 1970s, while private for-pro…t businesses supplied integrative services through accreditation systems. The role of nonpro…t organizations in the direct production of social services was somewhat marginal; nonpro…t organizations were con…ned to perform an advocacy function and supply social services only to the poorest people. In this context, the term mixed economy was referred to as a mix of for-pro…t businesses and public bodies in the provision of social services (e.g., Kazepov, 2009 ).
In the 1980s, due to the crisis of welfare state, a growing demand for social services related to new social needs (e.g., drug addiction and alcoholism), and the increasing participation of women in the labor market, the number of nonpro…t organizations rose and their productive role became more relevant. These productive nonpro…ts were institutionalized through the introduction of new organizational forms. Solidarity co-ops in Québec, sociétés coopératives d'intérêt collectif in France, social cooperatives in Italy, and, more generally and recently, social enterprises. Furthermore, the increasing relevance of social enterprises induced many governments to consider them as an active part of social policies and to establish new forms of public-private relationship, where private nonpro…t organizations directly supply social services (e.g., Ostrander, 1989 ).
The new century has witnessed a further evolution in welfare systems. An increasing presence of social enterprises and potential competition between social enterprises and for-pro…t businesses have been observed in social services sectors (e.g., Ben-Ner, 2002) . Accordingly, the term mixed economy is now often used to de…ne situations in which services are provided by di¤erent productive entities, including not-for-pro…ts (e.g., Beckford, 1991). Following this evolution of welfare systems and mixed economies, a new stream of theoretical economics literature on mixed oligopolies has ‡ourished. Initially, the benchmark was the analysis of competition between state-owned welfare-maximizing public …rms and pro…t-maximizing private …rms (see De Fraja and Delbono, 1990 , for a survey). Subsequently, the focus has shifted to e¢ ciency generated by cooperative …rms (e.g., Delbono and Reggiani, 2013; and Marini et al., 2015) . Our work is focused on social enterprises and contributes to this literature.
From an empirical point of view, several cross-country studies have investigated the growth of social enterprises. A seminal contribution is the Johns Hopkins Comparative
Nonpro…t Sector Project, conducted in 22 countries (European countries, Australia, Japan, the United States, and some Latin American countries) in the 1990s. As reported in this study, the expenditure of the nonpro…t economic sector was about $1.1 trillion, equivalent to 4.6% of the total GDP of the sample countries (Salamon and Anheier, 1997) . Further studies at the country level (e.g., CIRIEC, 2007) …nd that about 130,000 nonpro…t enterprises are active in France with more than 1.4 million employees; about 37,000 units in Portugal with 160,000 employees; 127,000 enterprises in Spain with 380,000 employees; 31,400 organizations in Sweden with 95,000 employees; about 13,000 organizations in Denmark with 121,000 people; 506,000 units in Germany, with more than 1.4 million employees. According to Salamon (2006, p. 402) , "nonpro…ts account for 40 percent of all hospital patient days in Germany, 55 percent of all residents in residential care facilities in French, three-fourths of all students in higher education in Japan, and much of the social service provision in Italy". Today, many nonpro…t enterprises are commercial institutions that sell their products and services in the marketplace. According to Kerlin (2006) , the commercial revenues of nonpro…t enterprises in the United States increased on average by 219% from 1982 to 2002; similarly, commercial revenues accounted for 57.6% of nonpro…t …rms'total revenues in 2002 compared with the 48.1% in 1982.
Setup
We introduce a hypothetical economy made up of two industrial sectors. In Sector A, a good is produced by for-pro…t …rms. For example, consider a car industry where producers are typically for-pro…t. Sector B supplies instead a social service (e.g., education and health-care). Each Sector j = A; B is characterized by a segment of length 1 where two …rms, indexed by i; j with i = 0; 1, are located at the extremes, …rm 0; j is at x = 0 and …rm 1; j at x = 1 (Figure 1 ). This type of segment is named Hotelling-type segment, after statistician and economist Harold Hotelling, and captures horizontal product di¤erentiation. Potential buyers of mass one are uniformly distributed along the segment. In each sector, each individual demands at most one unit of the commodity, the good in Sector A or the social service in Sector B.
[ Figure 1 here] Individuals derive utility s j from one unit of the commodity produced in Sector j = A; B. We refer to the di¤erence between utility and total purchase costs as surplus of an individual. More precisely, the surplus of an individual located at point x 2 [0; 1] is equal to s j p 0;j tx when buying the commodity from …rm 0; j; (a) s j p 1;j t (1 x) when buying the commodity from …rm 1; j;
(b) 0
when not buying a commodity,
where p 0;j (p 1;j ) is per unit of commodity price charged by …rm 0 (1) in Sector j = A; B.
Expressions tx and t (1 x) denote a further cost borne by the individual located at
x when buying from …rm 0; j and 1; j, respectively. The Hotelling framework …ts our analysis because of its " ‡exibility". Indeed, the segment where …rms compete by producing horizontally di¤erentiated commodities can be interpreted in several di¤erent ways.
Following the traditional interpretation, the segment can be thought of as a physical space: individuals bear transportation costs when moving along the segment to make their purchases. Location x of an individual denotes her/his geographical distance from the two …rms. In Figure 1 , for instance, x and 1 x are the distances travelled by the individual located at x when going to …rm 0; j and 1; j, respectively. In addition, parameter t > 0 denotes the per unit of distance cost of transportation. Overall, tx and t (1 x) are the transportation cost borne by the individual located at x when buying from …rm 0; j and 1; j, respectively. In Sector B, where social services are traded, tx and t (1 x) represents, for example, the cost of transporting children to school and day nursery or the elderly to hospitals.
An alternative and fairly innovative interpretation is compatible with the ‡exible
Hotelling framework and proposed in Section 5. Individuals are assumed to have heterogeneous tastes in …rm types (i.e., for-pro…t versus social enterprise). In this case, individuals bear ideological costs for not purchasing from the preferred type of …rm when "travelling" along the ideological space. This interpretation is rather natural when di¤erent types of …rms, not only for-pro…ts, coexist and when a social service is traded in the market. Indeed, the users' choice of social services providers is based on the perception of risk, con…dence, and trust, in which case the location x can describe the proximity in terms of identity and organizational …t, as described by the psychology and behavioral economics literature (e.g., Van Dyne and Pierce, 2004). 2 We de…ne two additional aspects, which are key to our analysis: …rms' pro…ts and surplus of all individuals. Firm i; j, is assumed to incur constant per unit of commodity production cost c j 0. Accordingly, its pro…t function is
where D i;j denotes the share of individuals who decide to buy from …rm i; j, i.e., the demand for the commodity supplied by …rm i; j. Surplus of …rm i; j's customers is given by
see online Appendix A.1 for computations. Surplus of individuals who do not buy is obviously zero:
Expression (3) is (negatively) a¤ected by the unit transportation cost t, which plays a crucial role in our framework. To illustrate this role, we denote with x I;j the location of an individual who obtains the same surplus when purchasing the commodity from …rm 0; j or …rm 1; j. This location is obtained after solving equality (1 -a) = (1 -b) by x:
We then plug x I;j into either (1 -a) or (1 -b) to get the surplus of the indi¤erent individual, denoted by I;j . In symbols,
Not surprisingly, I;j decreases when the unit transportation cost t increases.
In Figure 2 , we provide a graphical representation of individuals'surplus as a function of their location x, i.e., we depict (1 -a) and (1 -b). Intuitively, both expressions are decreasing in the distance travelled by the individuals, x when buying from …rm 0; j and
(1 x) when buying from …rm 1; j. We also depict the surplus of the indi¤erent individual, I;j , by assuming it is positive. In this case, the indi¤erent individual is willing to buy either from …rm 0; j or …rm 1; j. As a result, all individuals located to the left of x I;j buy from …rm 0; j, while those located to the right of x I;j buy from …rm 1; j. be fully covered because all individuals buy. Note that this is likely to occur when the unit transportation cost t is low, i.e., when the two downward-sloping bold lines are relatively ‡at.
[ Figure 2 here] In Figure 3 , instead, the surplus of the indi¤erent individual, I;j , is assumed to be negative, in which case the individual located at x I;j does not buy. As a result, the demand shares of …rms 0; j and 1; j become D 0;j = [0; x 0;j ] and D 1;j = [x 1;j ; 1], with x 0;j < x I;j < x 1;j . Sector j = A; B is said to be partially covered because individuals located in (x 0;j ; x 1;j ) do not buy. This is likely to occur when the unit transportation cost t is high, i.e., when the two downward-sloping bold lines are relatively steep.
[ Figure 3 here] The analysis proceeds by comparing two di¤erent economies.
(i) An economy where each …rm i = 0; 1 in each Sector j = A; B is for-pro…t. By de…nition, a for-pro…t …rm i; j aims at maximizing its own pro…t i;j .
(ii) An economy where both …rms are pro…t maximziers in Industry A, while Sector B is made up of the following mixed duopoly: …rm 0; B maximizes the surplus of its customers, CS 0;B , and it is referred to as a social enterprise, whereas …rm 1; B is a standard pro…t maximizer, which targets its own pro…t 1;B .
We introduce the following:
De…nition 1 An economy where all …rms are pro…t maximizers is de…ned as a market economy. An economy where both …rms are pro…t maximizers in Sector A and Sector B has a social enterprise is de…ned as a mixed economy.
In Sector B of the mixed economy, the unit production costs incurred by the two types of …rms are identical and equal to c B . In other words, the social enterprise and for-pro…t …rm are supposed to have access to the same production technology.
The timing of events in our framework is as follows.
At t = 0, in each Sector j = A; B of each economy, either market or mixed, …rms 0; j and 1; j simultaneously choose prices p 0;j and p 1;j to maximize their objective functions.
At t = 1, pro…ts accrue to the …rms.
We make the following reasonable hypothesis: price competition occurs only between …rms belonging to the same industrial Sector, either A or B, and not between …rms across sectors. This is due to the di¤erent nature of, and thus the di¤erent demand for, the commodities supplied in the two industries. One good is typically supplied by for-pro…t companies, for example, cars. The other is a social service, which is o¤ered by both for-pro…t and nonpro…t entities. Finally, we let the unit consumption utility s j be higher than the unit production cost c j in both industries. This is a necessary condition for trade between individuals and …rms to occur.
The analysis proceeds as follows. In the next Section we study the (Nash) equilibrium of the price competition game taking place at t = 0. We consider separately the market economy and mixed economy. In Section 4, we move to a welfare analysis.
Equilibrium Analysis
Market economy. We compute the equilibrium of the market economy and, then, study how the equilibrium is a¤ected by di¤erent values of the unit transportation cost t. All …rms set prices p i;j to maximize pro…t i;j , subject to the following constraint: all their customers must get a non-negative surplus, otherwise they would not buy.
The equilibrium prices in the market economy are computed in online Appendix A.2, where we show that in each Sector j = A; B, the two …rms set the same price, denoted by p j . This is because the two …rms are symmetric, i.e., they maximize the same pro…t function i;j . In line with the intuition provided by Figure 2 , we also prove that the full coverage of Sector j = A; B occurs only when the unit transportation cost t is relatively low (for the sake of precision, not larger than s j c j ). For higher values of t, instead, those individuals living close to x = 1 2 prefer not to buy: partial coverage occurs, as depicted in Figure 3 . These results come as no surprise. A higher t makes it more di¢ cult to serve all the individuals since, ceteris paribus, their surplus is negatively a¤ected, as testi…ed by
Mixed economy. We turn our focus on the mixed economy. According to De…nition 1, Sector A is still made up of two for-pro…t …rms, 0; A and 1; A, whose symmetric equilibrium price, p A , has been computed in online Appendix A.2.
By contrast, in Sector B, …rm 0; B is a customer surplus maximizer rather than pro…t maximizer. Accordingly, it aims at maximizing the surplus of its customers, CS 0;B , subject to the following constraint: its pro…ts must be non-negative, 0;B 0. This break-even constraint ensures the …nancial self-sustainability of the social enterprise. Since the surplus of its customers is negatively a¤ected by price, at equilibrium, the social enterprise sets the price p 0;B as low as possible, i.e., equal to the production cost c B , with the e¤ect that its equilibrium pro…t is zero, 0;B = 0. The price p 1;B set by the for-pro…t …rm 1; B is instead higher than c B : for computations, see online Appendix A.3, where we show that the full coverage of Sector B, depicted in Figure 2 , occurs only when transportation cost
To conclude this Section, we remark that an interesting aspect concerning coverage of Sector B arises when comparing the two di¤erent economies. The parametric interval where full coverage occurs is larger under the mixed economy, t
, rather than t s B c B . In other words, the social service market is more likely to be fully covered under the mixed economy. This is because the sum of equilibrium prices in the social Sector B is lower if the economy is mixed,
, which eases the purchase also for individuals who live far away. By setting its price as low as possible, the social enterprise forces the for-pro…t rival to reduce its own price in the mixed economy: 3 a side-e¤ect of the presence of a social enterprise is to make competition tougher.
We sum up these …ndings in the following Proposition (see online Appendix A.5 for a formal proof): 
Welfare Analysis
This Section compares two levels of welfare: (i) the welfare under the market economy, where competition occurs between for-pro…t …rms; (ii) the welfare under the mixed economy, where …rm 0 in Sector B is customer surplus maximizer. We adopt a utilitarian approach by de…ning welfare as the sum of …rms'pro…ts and surplus of all individuals in the two sectors.
Let us …rst consider the market economy. Since both …rms within each sector set the same price p j , at equilibrium, they end with the same pro…t, which we denote by j .
Similarly, customers of each …rm obtain the same total surplus within each sector, i.e., To proceed with our welfare analysis, we compare the welfare values arising in the two scenarios, market and mixed, by computing their di¤erence:
The surplus of individuals who do not buy, CS H;j , is zero; hence, it does not appear in (7) . Similarly, (7) where we allow the social enterprise to sell below cost.
In Figure 4 , we depict the two terms of di¤erence (7) is denoted by the solid line.
As is apparent from Figure 4 , welfare is larger in the market economy only when unit transportation cost t is relatively low. More precisely, in online Appendix A.6, we prove the following:
welfare is larger under the market economy. (ii)
welfare is larger under the mixed economy.
First note that both lines in Figure 4 are negatively a¤ected by t. As transportation cost t increases welfare decreases. 4 We discuss the results of Proposition 2 by considering the relevant intervals of t separately.
[ 
, the full coverage of Sector B occurs only in the mixed system according to Proposition 1. Figure 4 shows the downward-sloping dashed line is steeper than the downward-sloping solid line, meaning that the negative e¤ect of t on the welfare of the market economy is larger than that on the welfare of the mixed economy. This is due to the reduction in demand in the market economy. Welfare becomes greater under the mixed economy at t = 6(s B c B )
5
. This result is con…rmed in interval
, where again the full coverage of Sector B occurs only in the mixed system.
Extension I: t as an Ideological Cost
In line with the original Hotelling (1929) framework, the segment denotes a physical space and parameter t denotes a transportation cost in the above analysis. In this Section, we check the robustness of our …ndings by proposing an alternative interpretation.
We assume that Sector A, where only for-pro…t companies operate, is still represented by a physical space. Instead, we disregard transportation costs in the social service Sector B and suppose that the unit segment represents a space of …rm types. More precisely, a hypothetical …rm located at point x 2 [0; 1] is assumed to maximize the following objective function: a convex combination of its pro…ts and surplus of its customers, where x is the weight attached to pro…ts and 1 x is attached to customers'surplus. Accordingly, a social enterprise attaching maximum weight to customers'surplus is located at the extreme left of the unit segment, x = 0. By contrast, a for-pro…t …rm lies on the extreme right, x = 1, because it puts weight 1 on its pro…ts.
Similarly, the location of individuals along the segment denotes their ideological position towards …rm types. The ideal type for an individual located in x 2 [0; 1] consists in a …rm attaching weight x to its pro…ts and weight 1 x to the surplus of its customers.
Thus, this individual incurs the ideological cost tx when buying from a social enterprise located at 0 and t (1 x) when buying from a for-pro…t …rm located at 1, where t denotes the per unit of distance cost to …ll the ideological distance between an individual's ideal type of …rm and the actual type she/he buys from. This is an example of single-peaked preferences in the spirit of the median voter framework. One might think of an individual who takes into account both the social responsibility of companies and commercial and business aspects. If the individual gives higher importance to the former (latter), her/his ideological location is closer to the social enterprise (for-pro…t …rm).
This alternative interpretation of our framework does not a¤ect the strategic interaction in Sector B of the mixed economy. Indeed, the two rivals are still located at the extremes of the segment, the social enterprise 0; B at x = 0 and the for-pro…t …rm 1; B at x = 1. Accordingly, the mixed economy equilibrium is as that described in Section 3.
By contrast, the strategic interaction in Sector B of the market economy is a¤ected because the two rivals are pro…t maximziers and, therefore, both located at x = 1, rather than lying at the extremes of the segment. One can easily check that, given the same Bearing in mind that the mixed economy equilibrium is as that described in Section 3, we can write the following Proposition 3 When parameter t denotes an ideological rather than a transportation cost, the results of Propositions 1 and 2 stand.
The above Proposition proves that our …ndings are robust to the alternative speci…cation of parameter t as an ideological cost.
Extension II: Mixed Economy with Transfers
In this Section, we enrich our analysis by considering an alternative form of mixed economy, where the social enterprise in Sector B is allowed to set the price below its production cost. Accordingly, we modify the timing of events introduced in Section 2 by assuming that at t = 1, the social enterprise receives a lump-sum transfer k on top of the pro…ts realized.
Thus, we refer to this system as a mixed economy with transfers. The amount k is taken from pro…ts of …rms operating in Sector A and can be thought of as a non-distortionary lump-sum tax paid by the for-pro…ts to subsidize the social enterprise. 6 First, note that the strategic behavior of the two for-pro…t …rms in Sector A is not a¤ected since the transfer k is lump-sum. Equilibrium pro…ts of each …rm in Sector A are, thus, denoted by A minus the transfer to the social enterprise. Similarly, the equilibrium surplus of customers of each …rm is still equal to CS A . 5 For the sake of precision, there are two e¤ects on individuals'surplus. On the one hand, it is increased by the reduction in prices. On the other hand, it is reduced by the larger ideological costs borne by individuals. Indeed, all individuals located in x 2 0; 1 2 have to "travel ideologically" more than half of the segment when they decide to buy. The positive e¤ect of lower prices is shown to prevail over the negative one of higher ideological costs, with the e¤ect that individuals' surplus increases in comparison with that in the market economy, where t denotes transportation costs. 6 Including rival …rm 1; B's pro…ts as a source of transfers to the nonpro…t …rm would complicate the computations without adding any additional insight.
By contrast, in Sector B, the social enterprise 0; B solves a new problem. It still aims at maximizing the surplus of its customers, CS 0;B , but subject to a di¤erent constraint.
Given that …rm 0; B is now allowed to set the price below cost, the break-even constraint 0;B 0 is substituted with a price non-negativity constraint, p 0;B 0.
In online Appendix A.8, we show that the equilibrium in Sector B takes the following features. First, the social enterprise sets the equilibrium price, denoted by p 0;B , as low as possible, i.e., equal to 0. This price is lower than that in the mixed economy (with no The intuition for this result is as follows. By setting its price equal to zero, the social enterprise forces the for-pro…t rival to reduce its own price in the mixed economy. As a result, the social service market is more likely to be fully covered under the mixed economy with transfers. More precisely, in online Appendix A.9, we prove the following: With the aim of making a welfare comparison, we write the di¤erence in welfare between a market economy and mixed economy with transfers,
and, to simplify the reading of our results, we introduce the following notation:
In online Appendix A.10, we prove the following To understand why, note that the coverage of Sector B is strictly greater under the mixed economy with transfers when t > t We sum up the results of this Section. An interesting trade-o¤ arises when the social enterprise in Sector B is allowed to sell below cost. On the one hand, the coverage of the social service market is further enhanced. This happens because the social enterprise sets an even lower price than in the mixed economy without transfers. On the other hand, the parametric area, where welfare is lower under the market economy, shrinks. This is because the before-transfer losses incurred by the social enterprise negatively a¤ects welfare.
Policy Implications and Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated the impact of social enterprises on the individuals' access to social services and the level of utilitarian welfare. To this end, two di¤erent economic systems have been compared. A market economy where all …rms are pro…t maximziers; a mixed economy where one …rm, a social enterprise, maximizes the surplus of its customers and competes with a for-pro…t …rm in the supply of a social service. Our results have potentially relevant policy implications, which we detail in the following paragraphs.
In the basic setup of Sections 2, 3, and 4, no ideological costs have been considered. the entry of social enterprises should be adopted only by governments whose main aim is to enable more people to access the social service, i.e., enhance the redistributive e¤ect of social enterprises.
The …rst extension of the basic model helped explain the importance of mixed economies when ideological aspects drive individuals'choice between the di¤erent types of …rms supplying the social service. Interestingly, Proposition 3 con…rms the results of Propositions 1 and 2. This means that mixed economies are both more e¤ective and e¢ cient than market economies when ideological costs are relatively high, i.e., when individuals'preferences for di¤erent types of …rms are particularly heterogeneous. However, when individuals care less about the type of …rms, mixed economies are still more e¤ective in terms of enhanced access to the service but less e¢ cient than market economies. Implications for public policies are, mutatis mutandis, as above.
The second extension of the model investigated the case of a mixed economy with transfers, where governments play an active role by transferring monetary resources from for-pro…t …rms to social enterprises. An interesting trade-o¤ has been shown to arise.
On the one hand, Proposition 4 states that the coverage of the social service market is further enhanced. This means that the presence of subsidized social enterprises in the marketplace is even more e¤ective and their redistributive impact is magni…ed. On the other hand, Proposition 5 states that the parametric area in which utilitarian welfare is lower under the market economy shrinks. In other words, the possible negative impact of mixed economies on e¢ ciency is exacerbated.
In this context, one can think of alternative policies that encourage voluntary transfers to social enterprises rather than imposing (coercive) taxation on for-pro…t …rms. It has been argued (e.g., Rose-Ackerman, 1996) that an individual's overall utility is not negatively a¤ected in case she/he decides to donate. In other words, the amount of a donation positively enters into the utilitarian welfare function. This means that relying on voluntary contributions to social enterprises rather than, for example, taxation on for-pro…t …rms may increase the mixed economy e¤ectiveness without compromising e¢ ciency.
In conclusion, we remark that the issue of encouraging donations and citizens'involvement is extremely up-to-date: see, for example, some of the contents of the Social Business
Initiative (European Commission, 2011). This issue is one of the main pillars of a "Big
Society", where people participate in the creation and management of social enterprises and where an increasing "organizational biodiversity" in the marketplace might positively a¤ect economic e¢ ciency.
A Online Appendix

A.1 Individuals'Surplus
Denoting with D 0;j = [0; x 0;j ] and D 1;j = [x 1;j ; 1], x 0;j x 1;j , the demand shares of …rms 0; j and 1; j, x 0;j (x 1;j ) being the furthest individual who buys from …rm 0; j (1; j); the surplus of …rm 0; j's customers can be computed as follows:
The surplus of …rm 1; j's customers is
A.2 Market Economy Equilibrium
Since all …rms choose prices in order to maximize pro…t i;j and are symmetric within each Sector j = A; B, we can consider …rm 0; j as the representative one and study its strategic behavior. Firm 0; j solves the following program max p 0;j ;x 0;j (p 0;j c j ) x 0;j s.t. x 0;j x I;j and s j p 0;j tx 0;j 0,
The objective function of …rm 0; j is its pro…t. Recalling that …rm 0; j lies at the leftmost point of the unit segment, the …rst constraint in (12) ensures the furthest customer of …rm 0; j is at most the indi¤erent individual located at x I;j , see (5) . When such a constraint is binding, all individuals buy either from …rm 0; j or …rm 1; j: there is full coverage as in Figure 2 . In symbols, x 0;j = x I;j (and x I;j = x 1;j for symmetry of …rms). Instead, when the constraint is not active, x 0;j < x I;j (and x I;j < x 1;j for symmetry of …rms), there is no full coverage as in Figure 3 . The second constraint in (12) requires that all customers of …rm 0; j get a non-negative surplus. By virtue of (5), …rm 0; j problem (12) can be rewritten as 
The Lagrangian is
FOCs are ( @L @p 0;j = x 0;j 2t t = 0; @L @x 0;j = p 0;j c j = 0:
Since 0;j increases with x 0;j at least one of the two constraints must be binding at a solution to (13) . We thus study three alternative scenarios. 1) = 0 and > 0, then only the …rst constraint in (13) is binding, i.e.,
This means that the market is fully covered and that the indi¤erent individual gets positive surplus when buying. Plugging = 0 into the FOCs yields
whereby
by p 0;j and x 0;j yields p 0;j = p 1;j + c j + t 2 and x 0;j = p 1;j + t c j 4t :
Plugging p 0;j = p 1;j +c j +t 2 into (16) yields
Finally, note that is positive i¤ p 0;j c j > 0. Substituting p 0;j = p 1;j +c j +t 2 yields p 1;j > c j t.
2) 0 and 0, then both constraints are binding, i.e., 
This means that the market is fully covered and that the indi¤erent individual gets zero surplus when buying. FOCs are as in (15) , whereby ( = 2t t+p 1;j s j t (2s j t p 1;j ) + c j ; = 2 (2s j t p 1;j ) 2c j 2t
after plugging (22). Both and must be non-negative:
3) > 0 and = 0, then only the second constraint in (13) is binding, i.e.,
This implies that …rm 0 is local monopolist. Plugging > 0 and = 0 into the FOCs yields x 0;j t = 0; p 0;j c j = 0; 
Substituting p 0;j = c j +s j 2 into (25) yields
Finally, we check that > 0, i.e., p 0;j c j = tx 0;j > 0:
> 0, which holds true given that s j > c j .
Summing up the three scenarios yields …rm 0 best response:
(29) and
x 0;j = 8 > < > :
The symmetric equilibrium is hence as follows. or t > s j c j .
We can conclude that in the market economy the symmetric equilibrium of each industrial Sector j = A; B takes the following features. The equilibrium prices are p 0;j = p 1;j = p j , where
The equilibrium demands are instead D 0;j = D 1;j = D j , where
if t > s j c j :
Before explaining the above result, we compute the equilibrium values of …rms'pro…ts and individuals'surplus. Plugging (33) and (34) into (2) gives the symmetric equilibrium pro…ts 0;j = 1;j = j of each …rm in the two sectors,
Similarly, substituting (33) and (34) into (10) and (11) yields the symmetric equilibrium individuals'surplus CS 0;j = CS 1;j = CS j in the two sectors,
(36)
We discuss the market economy equilibrium results by studying the three relevant intervals of t separately. When the transportation costs are relatively low, t < 2 3 (s j c j ), only the …rst constraint in (12) is binding. This means that all individuals purchase and that the indi¤erent individual gets positive surplus. In that case, the equilibrium price p j = t + c j is increasing in t but the equilibrium demand D j = 1 2 is una¤ected because larger transportation costs make customers more captive, giving …rms larger market power. As a result, …rms' pro…ts j = t 2 (individuals' surplus CS j = 4s j 5t 4c j 8
) are positively (is negatively) a¤ected by t.
When transportation costs are larger, 2(s j c j ) 3 t s j c j , both constraints of program (12) are binding, which implies that there is still full coverage, but the indi¤erent individual gets zero surplus. In that case, the equilibrium price p j = s j t 2 becomes decreasing in t. The intuition is as follows. Plugging x 0;j = x I;j into s j p 0;j tx 0;j = 0 with p 0;j = p 1;j = p j yields the zero-surplus condition of the indi¤erent individual,
As t increases, p j must decrease in order for (37) to be ful…lled. Since the equilibrium demand D j = 1 2 is instead una¤ected, …rms'pro…ts j = 2s j t 2c j 4 (individuals'surplus CS j = t 8 ) are negatively (is positively) a¤ected by t. Finally, for relatively high transportation costs, t > s j c j , only the second constraint in (12) is active. In that case, Sector j is not fully covered, D 0;j + D 1;j = is negatively a¤ected.
A.3 Mixed Economy Equilibrium
In the mixed economy the symmetric equilibrium of Sector A is as in Appendix A. 
First notice that the objective function is decreasing in p 0;B , hence p 0;B = c B is optimal. In such a case the two constraints can be rewritten as 
in which case only the second constraint in (39) is binding. This means that …rms are local monopolists. By contrast, solution to (39) is
in which case only the …rst constraint in (39) is binding. This means that the market is fully covered and the indi¤erent individual gets non-negative surplus. Summing up yields social enterprise 0 best response:
For-pro…t …rm 1; B best response functions are given by (29) and (30), mutatis mutandis: We can conclude that in the mixed economy the equilibrium of Sector B takes the following features. The equilibrium prices are
The equilibrium demands are
:
(48) Before commenting on the above results, we calculate equilibrium …rms' pro…ts in Sector B. To this aim, we plug (47) and (48) into (2) with j = B: 0;B = 0;
Similarly, we plug (47) and (48) into (10) and (11) to compute the equilibrium individuals' surplus,
We have all the elements to explain the mixed economy equilibrium results in Sector B. First remark that the customer surplus maximizer 0; B charges p 0;B = c B and ends up with zero pro…ts. This is because customer surplus CS 0;B is negatively a¤ected by the price, as one can check by inspecting the objective function of program (39). On the contrary, the for-pro…t …rm 1; B sets a larger price, p 1;B > p 0;B for any t. As a result, the demand share of …rm 0; B is greater.
More precisely, when t < 4(s 
A.4 Equilibrium Prices
, which is ful…lled.
A.5 Proposition 1
We observe that ,
> 0, which is true. These results prove Proposition 1.
A.6 Proposition 2
Relying on (35) and (36) with j = B, we can write ) are positively (is negatively) a¤ected by t when t , summation (52) is …rst increasing and then decreasing in t and reaches its maximum at t = p 2 (s B c B ). This is driven by the fact that The symmetric equilibrium price charged by the two for-pro…t …rms in Sector B of the market economy is p I B = c B . This Bertrand outcome is because there is no di¤erentiation when the two …rms are located at the same point, x = 1 in this case. Under the assumption that …rms share equally the demand, the symmetric equilibrium demand of each …rm is
. This means that full coverage occurs if and only if t s B c B . In that case, the equilibrium surplus of each …rm's clients is
obtained after plugging p I B = c B and D I B = 1 2 into (11). The market is not fully covered if t > s B c B , in which case the symmetric equilibrium demand is as in (34) and the equilibrium surplus of each …rm's clients is > 0.
A.8 Mixed Economy with Transfers Equilibrium
In the mixed economy with transfers …rm 0; B solves the following problem: 
(59) To calculate equilibrium …rms'pro…ts and individuals'surplus in Sector B of the mixed economy with transfers, we plug (58) 
where recall that k is the amount transferred to the …rm 0; B at t = 1. Observe that …rm 0; B incurs losses for any t when k = 0, i.e., 0;B < 0. We assume that the source of funding, total pro…ts of Sector A, is su¢ cient to recover such losses, thus enabling the social enterprise to break-even for any t, P 
We have all the elements to explain the equilibrium results. First remark that the social enterprise 0; B charges zero price. This is because customer surplus CS 0;B is negatively a¤ected by the price, as one can check by inspecting the objective function of program (57). On the contrary, the for-pro…t …rm 1; B sets at least p 1;B = c B in order not to incur losses. As a result, the demand share of …rm 0; B is greater, D 0;B > D 1;B for any t.
More precisely, when t c B individuals can move easily along the segment. In symbols, At t > c B those individuals located far from …rm 0; B prefer to resort to the for-pro…t rival, i.e., D 1;B > 0, despite the price di¤erential.
When t 2 c B ; 4s B c B 3 full coverage occurs and the indi¤erent individual gets positive surplus. The equilibrium price charged by the for-pro…t …rm 1; B, p 1;B = t+c B 2 , is increasing in t as in Section 3. Notwithstanding, its demand D 1;B = t c B 4t is increasing as well because its customers become more captive. As a result, …rm 1; B's pro…ts, 
A.10 Proposition 5
We denote with W 0 the di¤erence in (8) and study its sign as parameter t increases. When W 0 > 0 (< 0), welfare is larger (lower) under the market economy. It is useful to compute the sum of …rms' pro…ts and individuals' surplus in Sector B of the mixed economy with transfers. We have (64) First note that the ordering of relevant t-cuto¤s for equilibrium pro…ts and individuals' surplus under the two economies depends on c B and s B : see (51) and (64).
